We analyse the e¤ects of fee-for-service versus …xed salary on the treatment decisions of general practitioners (GPs) and on patients'health outcomes. Using rich Norwegian register data for the period 2009-2013, we …nd that GPs respond strongly and consistently to changes in remuneration type. Compared with …xed salary, GP payment by fee-for-service leads to an increase in the supply of consultations and a higher provision of medical services (along several dimensions) per consultation. This has also signi…cant implications for patients' health outcomes, with a more than 16 percent reduction in the probability of an emergency hospital admission (more than 46 percent reduction for ambulatory care sensitive conditions) shortly after a GP consultation.
Introduction
How should provider payment schemes be designed in order to ensure e¢ cient provision of health care? This is one of the classic questions in health economics and a long-standing policy issue in most countries. In this paper we address one particular aspect of this question by examining how the type of remuneration scheme a¤ects the treatment decisions of general practitioners (GPs) and how this, in turn, a¤ects the total cost of primary care provision and the patients'health outcomes. We make use of extremely rich and high-quality Norwegian register data, which cover all primary care consultations and all admissions to public hospitals for the period [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] , in order to compare treatment decisions and patient health outcomes under two di¤erent remuneration schemes -…xed salary and fee-for-service -which coexist in the Norwegian primary care market. 1 A key challenge in establishing a causal relationship between remuneration type and GP behaviour is self-selection of physicians into di¤erent remuneration schemes, since GPs'preferences for remuneration type might be systematically correlated with their treatment decisions.
We deal with this potential problem by focusing on GP locums. These are (mainly) younger physicians, not yet established as regular GPs, who …ll short-term positions that vary with respect to remuneration scheme. We identify 471 GP locums who are exposed to both types of remuneration (at least once) during the period of analysis. This allows us to estimate models with physician …xed e¤ects, such that identi…cation of the estimated e¤ects is based on observing the same physician under di¤erent remuneration schemes.
Our data allows us to estimate the e¤ects of remuneration type on a wide range of variables related to the GPs' treatment decisions: number of consultations, prolonged consultations, medical procedures, laboratory tests, patient recalls, issuance of sickness certi…cates and referral to hospital. In addition, we use the total fee per consultation as a monetary measure of the total amount of GP services provided. We also estimate the e¤ect of remuneration type on patients' health outcomes, where the latter are proxied by using information on emergency admissions to hospital (shortly after a GP consultation).
We …nd remarkably strong and consistent results. On average, a change in remuneration scheme from …xed salary to fee-for-service leads to a large increase in the supply of consultations (by more than 21 percent) and to a signi…cant increase in the total amount of medical services provided per consultation (by around 4.5 percent, as measured by the total fee per consultation).
The increase in the supply of services per consultation is consistent and signi…cant across all measured dimensions of service provision. If being paid by fee-for-service instead of …xed salary, GPs more often provide prolonged consultations, perform more medical procedures, take more lab tests, recall patients more often, and are more prone to issue a sickness certi…cate. These results are all estimated with a high degree of precision.
We also explore the importance of GP preferences by creating two sub-samples consisting of consultations with GP locums who later become regular GPs with …xed salary or fee-for-service contracts, respectively. The underlying assumption is that remuneration type for regular GPs is, to a much larger extent than for locums, a result of GP choice, where more (less) pro…t-oriented GPs self-select into remuneration contracts based on fee-for-service (…xed salary). Interestingly, we …nd that our previously described main results are to a large extent driven by the behaviour of locums who later on establish themselves as regular GPs with fee-for-service contracts. Given our underlying assumption, this suggests that the e¤ects of remuneration type are larger for more pro…t-oriented physicians. This result, and all of our main results described above, con…rm a set of hypotheses derived from a simple theoretical model of physician behaviour which is presented in Section 3 of the paper.
Finally, we analyse the extent to which the aforementioned e¤ects of remuneration type have any implications for patients'health outcomes. It turns out that patients are signi…cantly, and surprisingly strongly, a¤ected by the remuneration scheme of the GPs they attend. The probability of experiencing an emergency admission to hospital within two weeks of a GP consultation is almost 16 percent lower if the GP had a fee-for-service contract instead of …xed salary (the corresponding probability is more than 46 percent lower if we consider ambulatory care sensitive conditions only). Thus, although switching from …xed salary to fee-for-service increases the costs of primary care provision, patients do seem to bene…t, at least when using emergency admissions to hospitals as a measure of health outcomes. Based on the estimated value of the additional services provided by fee-for-service GPs, paying GPs by fee-for-service instead of …xed salary implies that the corresponding reduction in emergency admissions to hospital can be obtained at a cost in the range of around NOK 3,300 per averted emergency admission. 2 The relatively modest magnitude of these costs, which are considerably lower than the average cost of emergency hospital admissions during our period of analysis, suggests that …xed-salary remuneration leads to underprovision of primary care services.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present a relatively brief overview of the relevant literature and explain in detail how our paper contributes to this literature. We proceed in Section 3 by presenting a simple theoretical model of GP behaviour from which we derive some testable hypotheses. In Section 4 we explain the relevant institutional features of the Norwegian primary care market, whereas data and descriptive statistics are presented in Section 5. Our empirical strategy is explained in Section 6, and our main results are presented and discussed in Section 7. In Section 8 we identify and test for potential biases in our main analysis. The analysis is then extended in Section 9, where we explore the e¤ects of GP heterogeneity with respect to pro…t orientation. Section 10 includes a brief discussion and comparison of the results obtained when basing the analysis on regular GPs instead of locums.
Finally, Section 11 closes the paper with some concluding remarks.
Literature review
There is a huge literature, spanning several decades, providing solid evidence that physicians tend to respond, in one way or another, to …nancial incentives (e.g., Gaynor and Pauly, 1990; Gaynor and Gertler, 1995; Gruber and Owings, 1996; Croxson et al., 2001 ; Clemens and Gottlieb, 2014; Brekke et al., 2017) . A smaller strand of this literature addresses the potential e¤ects of di¤erent types of remuneration schemes on physician behaviour. Several studies …nd that remuneration schemes based on fee-for-service tend to stimulate the volume of patient visits in particular. Two relatively well-known early studies are Hickson et al. (1987) and Krasnik et al. (1990) . 3 In the former study, the authors compare fee-for-service with …xed salary remuneration in a randomised controlled trial involving 18 pediatric physicians and …nd that the number of patient visits is signi…cantly higher under fee-for-service payment. A similar result is found in the latter study, where fee-for-service is compared with capitation in a controlled before-and-after design with 100 randomly selected physicians.
The positive e¤ect of fee-for-service payment on the number of patient visits is also corroborated in several later studies. For example, Sørensen and Grytten (2003) There is also some evidence that fee-for-service payment leads to less referrals to specialists, compared with other remuneration schemes. This result is found by, e.g., Liddy et al. (2014) and Sarma et al. (2018) , when comparing fee-for-service with capitation using Canadian data. Our study provides additional evidence that fee-for-service remuneration yields lower referral rates by GPs, although our basis of comparison is …xed-salary remuneration instead of capitation. 4 However, there are also studies that report little or no e¤ect of remuneration type on some dimensions of physician behaviour. For example, Grytten and Sørensen (2001) …nd no di¤erences between fee-for-service and salaried physicians in how they respond to increased competition.
Based on a …eld experiment in the UK, Gosden et al. (2003) …nd no signi…cant di¤erences between …xed salaries and fee-for-service on primary care physician behaviour.
The above referenced literature has a number of di¤erent weaknesses, though. First, it is notoriously hard to properly control for the e¤ects of self-selection of physicians into di¤erent remuneration schemes, and the few studies that use an experimental design tend to be based on very small sample sizes. 5 Second, most studies are restricted to one or very few outcome measures, typically the number of patient visits or similar volume measures. Crucially, objective measures of patient health outcomes are virtually absent from the literature. It is also worth noting that previous studies are almost exclusively based on survey data. physician behaviour and …nd that fee-for-service induces a signi…cant increase in the supply of services. However, based on a somewhat di¤erently designed experiment, Green (2014) reports that fee-for-service leads to both lower quality of services and higher costs of care, compared to …xed salary or capitation. In a similar vein, and based on a medically framed real e¤ort experiment, Lagarde and Blaauw (2017) …nd that, whereas fee-for-service payment leads to higher output than …xed salary, the latter remuneration scheme yields higher quality of output. By contrast, our empirical results do not provide any evidence that the choice between fee-for-service and …xed salary implies any quantity-quality trade-o¤, as suggested by some of the experimental literature.
The access to extremely rich register data allows us, in the present paper, to make signi…cant contributions to the literature along three di¤erent dimensions. (i) We construct an empirical strategy that to a large extent eliminates the physician selection problem and therefore allows us to establish a credible causal relationship between type of remuneration scheme and physician behaviour. (ii) We measure the e¤ects across a wide variety of outcomes, covering all main aspects of the physicians'treatment behaviour, which allows us to paint a much more complete picture of the relationship between remuneration type and physician behaviour. (iii) We measure the e¤ect of remuneration type on objective proxies of patient health outcomes, which allows us to draw (at least tentative) conclusions regarding over-or underprovison of primary care services.
Theoretical model
In this section we present a simple theoretical model that captures what we believe to be the key mechanisms in the relationship between remuneration schemes and GP behaviour in the short run, when the GP's patient list size is …xed. We use this model to derive some predictionsstated in Proposition 1 below -that are tested in the empirical analysis.
Consider a GP who has a …xed patient list that generates demand for consultations from a certain number of patients per period. Each patient is characterised by a severity level s, which is randomly distributed on the interval [s; s] according to a probability density function f (s).
We assume that s is observable to the GP during a consultation. The health bene…t from being treated by the GP is given by b (q; s), where q is the amount of services provided by the GP.
We assume that b is increasing and concave in q. We also assume that there exists a threshold severity level b s, such that, if s < b s, the GP must treat the patient himself, whereas, if s b s, the GP can choose between treating the patient himself or referring the patient to specialist care, in which case the patient enjoys a health bene…t e b (s). We assume that e b (s) > b (q; s) for s b s and that the di¤erence e b (s) b (q; s) is strictly increasing in s, for all q. This implies that, for all patients who are potential candidates for referral (i.e., with s b s), the GP cannot fully compensate for a lack of specialist care by increasing his own service provision, and even less so the higher the severity of the patient. 6 We assume that the GP has semi-altruistic preferences and maximises a linear combination of own pro…ts and patient health bene…t, net of non-monetary costs of consultations and service provision. Denoting the number of consultations by n, the non-monetary costs of consultations are given by an increasing and strictly convex function k (n). The non-monetary costs of service provision, q, is given by an increasing and strictly convex function c (q). In order to ensure that the GP always chooses a strictly positive level of service provision, we assume that c (0) = 0 and
We consider two di¤erent remuneration schemes. If the GP has a fee-for-service contract, he receives a fee per consultation and also a fee per unit of services o¤ered during a consultation.
Let p > 0 and p > 0 denote the consultation and service fees, respectively, net of monetary costs. 7 On the other hand, if the GP has a …xed-salary contract, his revenues per period only consist of a …xed wage w. Let s b s be the threshold level of severity above which the GP refers a patient to specialist care. The GP's expected per-period payo¤ (with n consultations) 6 Referral to specialist care (e.g., a hospital admission) might in itself imply a disutility for the patient, for example because of travelling. However, for su¢ ciently high-severity patients (s b s) we assume that such disutilities are more than outweighed by the health gains of receiving specialist care. 7 Thus, we assume linearity in the monetary costs of consultations and service provision.
is given by
where is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 (0) if the GP has a fee-for-service (…xed-salary) contract, and where > 0 measures the degree of GP altruism. 8 We assume that the GP chooses the number of consultations scheduled per period, n; the referral threshold rate, s ; and the amount of services provided during each consultation, q.
The latter choice is obviously made for each single consultation and depends (in part) on the patient's severity level. From (1) it is straightforward to derive the optimal amount of services provided to a patient with severity s s , which is implicitly given by
The service level is set such that the GP's marginal bene…t is equal to the GP's marginal cost of service provision.
Let the solution to (2) be denoted by q ( ; s). If the optimal referral threshold s is an interior solution (i.e., if s > b s), it is implicitly given by
Given the optimal service level, the (interior-solution) referral threshold is set such that the GP's pro…t from treating the marginal patient (with severity level s ) is equal to the patient's health gain of being treated by a specialist instead of the GP, weighted by .
Finally, regarding the GP's optimal choice of consultations, n , we assume that this is an interior solution to the problem where (1) is maximised with respect to n. One interpretation of this assumption is that that there is excess demand for consultations per period and that GP availability is rationed by waiting times. An alternative interpretation is that the GP can induce the desired demand for consultations through patient recalls. Given the optimal referral threshold, s ( ), and the optimal service provision, q ( ; s), the optimal number of consultations per period is implicitly given by
The GP should optimally o¤er consultations up to the point where the marginal bene…t from consultations is equal to the marginal cost. The marginal gain consists of three elements, given by the …rst three terms in (4): (i) the direct monetary (net) bene…t p (which only applies under fee-for-service remuneration), (ii) the expected net bene…t generated through service provision during one additional consultation, and (iii) the expected altruistic bene…t derived through referral to specialist care, in case one additional consultation implies seeing a patient with severity s > s ( ).
Proposition 1 For a given patient list size, a GP with a fee-for-service contract will supply more consultations, o¤ er more services per consultation and adopt a weakly higher threshold for specialist referrals than an otherwise similar GP with a …xed-salary contract. These di¤ erences are larger for more pro…t-oriented GPs.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind these results is relatively straightforward, though there are several di¤erent mechanisms at play. A fee-for-service GP has clearly a higher marginal bene…t of service provision during a consultation, since the provision of such services generates extra revenue to the GP. These incentives are absent in a …xed-salary contract and fee-for-service remuneration therefore leads to higher service provision.
The e¤ect of di¤erent remuneration schemes on patient referrals is not quite as clear-cut.
Fee-for-service payment leads to less referrals, but only if the GP is su¢ ciently pro…t-oriented.
Such a GP will generate a positive surplus from service provision (i.e, pq ( ; s ) > c (q ( ; s ))) and place a relatively low weight on patients'bene…t of being treated by a specialist. Thus, a su¢ ciently pro…t-oriented fee-for-service GP optimally chooses s > b s and treats some patients (with s 2 (b s; s )) that would have been better o¤ being treated by a specialist. Otherwise, if the GP is su¢ ciently altruistic, remuneration type does not a¤ect referral decisions.
In contrast, fee-for-service remuneration will unambiguously stimulate the supply of consultations. The reason is simply that, under fee-for-service, extra revenues are generated by o¤ering more consultations -directly through the consultation fee and indirectly through the generation of surplus from service provision during a consultation.
Finally, notice that the importance of remuneration type depends on GP preferences. A more pro…t-oriented GP will respond stronger to a change in remuneration scheme along all three dimensions considered: service provision, patient referrals and supply of consultations. A more detailed description of the mechanisms behind this result is given in the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix.
Institutional background
In the Norwegian National Health Service, primary care provision is the responsibility of the municipalities, although funding and regulation are largely made by the central government. Regarding patient lists, the only regulations are related to the number of slots (maximum 2500 and minimum 500 without special permission), that GPs with vacant slots cannot turn down patients who want to be listed with them, and that patients can switch to a di¤erent list at most twice per year. About 90% of regular GPs are self-employed physicians contracting with municipalities, with the remaining GPs being directly employed by the municipalities. The latter type of contract is relatively more common in rural areas, where the potential patient population is more limited.
The payment system for self-employed GPs is a combination of a capitation fee (covered by the municipalities) and fee-for-service (covered partly by the National Health Insurance Scheme and partly by patient copayment), where the fee-for-service part constitutes, on average, around 70% of the GP's total income. On the other hand, GPs employed by the municipality receive a …xed salary. Irrespective of payment scheme, towards the end of each consultation, GPs present remuneration claims electronically to the National Health Insurance Administration (GPs on …xed salary claim fee-for-service on behalf of their employer). These claims constitute an important source of information for our analysis. In order for physicians to qualify for health insurance reimbursements, two di¤erent requirements must be met: they must be certi…ed as medical doctors according to EU regulations or document that they are under supervision, and they must either have a regular GP contract or work as a regular GP locum. 9
Although solo practices are not uncommon, most regular GPs work in group practices. This applies to 89.1% of the fee-for-service GPs and 81.2% of the salaried GPs, and the proportion of consultations that take place in group practices is around 80%. In any case, the fee-for-service is paid directly from the state to the individual GP, implying that the remuneration of GPs (in a given remuneration scheme) is identical in solo and group practices.
In this analysis, we study the behaviour of locums in order to investigate GP behaviour in general (we discuss and justify this strategy in Section 6). There are numerous reasons why locums are in demand, and locums are used as part of a normal GP work year. According to an agreement between the physicians'association and the municipalities'association, a full-time regular GP is obliged to receive patients at least 28 hours a week, 44 weeks a year. Regular GPs are entitled to absence from their practice for speci…c reasons, such as having holiday, taking courses, doing research, own illness or children's illness, pregnancy and childbirth. 10 Sometimes colleagues can step in, but in many cases a locum is needed. Consequently, the use of locums is quite widespread; our data shows that during one year (2009) about 30% of all GPs use a locum at least once. During our period of analysis, 8.1% (6.5%) of all consultations remunerated with fee-for-service (…xed salary) were carried out by a locum GP.
Besides the provision of primary care, GPs are also entrusted with important gatekeeping functions regarding referrals to specialist care and certi…cation of sick leave. In Norway, sickness insurance is mandatory, with sickness coverage of 100% from the …rst day of sick leave. A medical certi…cate is required for spells of absence of more than three days or eight days, depending on whether the employer has signed a national agreement aimed at reducing sickness absence.
Municipalities are also responsible for emergency primary health care provision, which is o¤ered at local primary care emergency centres (PCECs). 11 These centres are the sole providers of primary care during evenings, nights and weekends. In larger municipalities, PCECs also o¤er services at daytime. All regular GPs below the age of 60 are obliged to work part of their time at PCECs, unless they are exempted for health or social reasons. When working in a PCEC, GPs are paid according to the same fee-for-service schedule as the one that applies to regular GP practices, and the matching between physicians and patients in PCEC consultations is random. A distinctive feature of the Norwegian primary care market is that, compared to many other countries, primary care emergency services are frequently used, and often in relation to conditions that could just as well have been treated by the patient's regular GP, a pattern which is explained by relatively poor access to the GP during daytime (Sandvik et al., 2012).
5 Data and descriptive statistics
Data sources
In order to analyse how physicians respond to di¤erent remuneration schemes (…xed salary or feefor-service), we apply Norwegian administrative register data from several sources. These data can be merged because patients and physicians are both identi…ed by unique personal identi…ers.
From the National Health Insurance Administration (HELFO), we obtain information about the fee-for-service payments to GPs from the National Insurance Scheme. For each consultation, the GP sends (electronically) a claim to the National Health Insurance. The GP speci…es the medical reason for attendance (based on the International Classi…cation of Primary Care, ICPC-2) and procedures performed in the consultation (based on detailed procedure codes). The invoice also includes the personal identity number of the operating GP and of the patient, and the date of consultation. Since there are speci…c codes and associated tari¤s for each service, we observe the medical treatment provided to each patient, including medical procedures, laboratory tests, prolonged consultations 12 , etc. We also observe the GP's total income per visit, as well as patient characteristics, such as age, gender, diagnosis and comorbidity. Data on the patient's education and total income, including labour income, are available from Statistics Norway.
The database Fastlegedatabasen has information on each GP list on a monthly basis (i.e., the GP identi…er and the GP's list of patients). Thus, for every patient, it is possible to identify his/her regular GP and GP characteristics such as age, gender, country of birth, and whether the GP is a specialist in general medicine. 13 We also know whether or not the GP works in a group practice, and whether or not the GP shares the patient list with another GP. Furthermore, information about both actual and desired patient list size allows us to observe whether the GP's list is full or not. Finally, the Norwegian Patient Register contains information on referrals and admissions to secondary care in Norway, including the day of referral and day of hospital admission, as well as type of admission (elective or emergency).
Identi…cation of GP locums and their remuneration schemes
The National Health Insurance data inform us -for each consultation -who is the operating GP and how this GP is remunerated, but they do not identify locums directly. To identify whether the GP is a locum, we impose the following exclusion criteria: (i) the GP identi…er of the consultation cannot correspond to that of the patient's own regular GP or any other regular GP registered in the Fastlegedatabasen in that particular month, and (ii) the GP registered for the consultation should not be an intern. We want to exclude all consultations with interns since internships are categorised by …xed salary only. By applying these exclusion criteria, we isolate the subsample of consultations held by locums. We then de…ne characteristics of the practice (i.e., the regular GP of the treated patient), such as list length, by linking the treated patient with the patient list information.
Our explanatory variable of interest is the locum's remuneration scheme, which may vary over time since it mirrors the remuneration scheme of the regular GP practice that the locum works in.
Outcome variables
We investigate several dimensions of GPs'service provision: total fee per consultation, whether the patient visits the same GP practice within 14 days (recalls), whether the patient is referred to hospital for a planned admission, as well as number of consultations per day. We also investigate speci…c components of GPs'service provision during a consultation: whether the consultation is prolonged or not, whether a test is taken, the number of medical procedures, and whether the GP issues a sickness certi…cate. Apart from referrals, these outcome variables are all generated from the HELFO data. These health indicators relate to the period shortly after a GP visit (1-14 days), and they are generated by merging data from the HELFO and the Norwegian Patient Register by means of the patient personal identi…er. Each of these three measures should to some extent capture a patient's health outcome after a GP visit, though presumably with di¤erent degrees of precision.
The …rst measure is probably the least precise proxy, since visits at PCECs might be related to unavailability of the patient's regular GP and might not necessarily be caused by acute illness.
On the other hand, PCEC visits might be interpreted more broadly as a quality indicator of the primary care provision by the GP, re ‡ecting either bad treatment resulting in an adverse event or lack of treatment (unavailability) inducing the patient to seek care at a PCEC. Among our two measures based on emergency hospital admissions, the more restricted measure based on ambulatory care sensitive conditions is arguably the most appropriate one for our purposes, since it is based on conditions for which e¤ective primary care provision is, by de…nition, crucial to prevent the need for hospital admissions.
Our data sources cover all GP consultations and all admissions to public hospitals for the years 2009-2013. 15 We include all consultations where the patient is above 20 years of age. This leaves us with a data set of 5,134,780 observations (consultations), involving 4,438 locums. As we will explain more elaborately in the next section, our identi…cation strategy relies on observing 1 4 The variable referrals for planned admissions is generated by comparing the date of consultation in the HELFO data with the date of referral in the Norwegian Patient Register. 1 5 Admissions to mental health hospitals are excluded.
14 the same locum under di¤erent remuneration schemes. In our data we have 471 locums who has worked under each of the two contract types (…xed salary and fee-for-service) at least once. We therefore restrict our sample to all consultations involving this subset of locums. This sample consists of 699,878 consultations involving 316,926 di¤erent patients. 16 In Table 1 we show the descriptive statistics characterising our main sample, where these statistics are decomposed according to type of remuneration scheme. The mean values of our dependent variables di¤er across the two remuneration types in a quite clear and consistent way.
When paid by fee-for-service, locum GPs hold more consultations and o¤er more services per consultation than when paid with …xed salary, as shown by the higher average total fee per consultation. A patient recall is also more likely when the locum GP is paid fee-for-service.
On the other hand, the frequency of planned hospital admissions is lower. A closer look at locum GPs' service provision during a consultation reveals that, along all dimensions studied, fee-for-service locums o¤er more services. They have a larger share of prolonged consultations, take more tests and perform more medical procedures. They also issue sickness certi…cates more often.
[ Table 1 ]
The patient population also di¤ers according to remuneration schemes. Patients in fee-forservice consultations are on average 3 years younger and the proportion of women as well as the average level of education and income are higher than for patients visiting locums on …xed salary.
This could re ‡ect a rural/urban di¤erence. The proportion of patients with any comorbidity is also higher, on average, in consultations with fee-for-service locums, which could partly re ‡ect a higher share of women in the patient population of fee-for-service GPs.
Regarding the characteristics of the 471 locums, the most noticeable feature is that the average age is relatively low (37) and that less than 4 percent of them are specialists in general medicine, which indicates that most of them are early in their career. It is also worth noticing that practices remunerated with fee-for-service are characterised by somewhat longer patient lists, which again probably re ‡ects an urban/rural di¤erence. In the empirical analysis, we will control for a wide range of patient, GP and practice characteristics. We will also include municipality …xed e¤ects to control for potential biases related to the geographical distribution of practices, such as di¤erences in the mean distance to the GP o¢ ce and to specialist services, and di¤erences in the degree of GP competition.
Empirical strategy
The main challenge involved in identifying the causal e¤ect of di¤erent remuneration schemes on GP behaviour is to account for a potential selection bias arising from the fact that the matching of GPs to remuneration schemes is partly a result of GP choice. If GPs can choose between …xed-salary contracts and fee-for-service contracts, and if these choices are systematically related to di¤erences in GP practice styles, which in turn might be related to di¤erences in GP preferences (e.g., the GP's degree of pro…t orientation), the observed di¤erences in GP behaviour across di¤erent remuneration schemes would to some extent capture di¤erences in GP preferences rather than di¤erences in remuneration schemes, which would lead to biased estimates. 17 Our empirical strategy to tackle this potential selection problem is two-fold. First, we restrict our sample to consultations involving only GP locums. As described in the previous section, this subset of GPs consists of relatively young physicians, many of whom have not yet established their own practice. These are GPs who spend a period taking up available vacancies until they are able to enter the market as regular GPs. Thus, for this subset of GPs, it is reasonable to assume that the matching of GPs to remuneration schemes depends largely on the availability of temporary vacancies and is therefore, to a considerable extent, random. The fact that these are mostly short-term vacancies gives additional credibility to the assumption of random matching. 18 Second, the quality of our data allows us to identify GPs who face di¤erent remuneration schemes -…xed salary and fee-for-service -over time. Thus, we are able to estimate models with GP …xed e¤ects, where identi…cation is based on observing the same GP under both types of remuneration schemes.
For the locums used in our main sample, we have also checked that there is no systematic relationship between the sequence of vacancies and the type of remuneration. Thus, we …nd no pattern where locums tend to …rst work in a …xed-salary practice and then in a fee-for-service practice, or vice versa. 19 For the subset of GP locums who were observed in only two temporary positions (with di¤erent remuneration schemes), 59.8% had a …xed salary in the …rst position, which is reasonably close to what we would expect if remuneration schemes were randomly assigned to GPs. 20 This is reassuring for the internal validity of our empirical strategy.
Finally, it is also worth emphasising that not only is the use of locums widespread, as discussed in Section 5, but it is also very common for GPs to work as locums at some point We estimate the following empirical model,
where y ijtm measures the treatment decision (according to each of the variable de…nitions described in Section 5) of GP i in a consultation involving a patient with diagnosis j at time t in municipality m; F F S is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 (0) if the GP is paid by fee-for-service (…xed salary); X ijt is a vector of patient characteristics, such as gender, age, education and income; and Z it is a vector of practice characteristics, such as list size, solo or group practice, shared patient list or not, and whether or not the list is full. To better control for di¤erences in patient populations across practices, we also include in Z it aggregate patient list characteristics, such as share of males, average age and income, and distribution of education levels among the patients on the list. Then we include a number of …xed e¤ects: i is a GP …xed e¤ect; j is a diagnosis …xed e¤ect (separate …xed e¤ects for 649 main diagnoses and 588 comorbidities); m is a municipality …xed e¤ect (for 335 municipalities); and ! t is a time …xed e¤ect (year and month). Finally, " ijtm is an error term.
Our parameter of interest is 1 , which measures the e¤ect of changing the GP remuneration scheme from …xed salary to fee-for-service. Importantly, the inclusion of a GP …xed e¤ect implies that we are able to control for all time-invariant (observable and unobservable) GP characteristics, including the degree of altruism or pro…t-orientation, which is likely to a¤ect the GP's response to di¤erent remuneration schemes. In all our estimations, standard errors are clustered at GP level. In the estimations, we employ a high-dimensional …xed e¤ect model using the Stata module reghdfe (Correia, 2014).
Results and discussion
Our main results are presented in this section. First we present the e¤ects of GP remuneration type on a wide range of variables that characterise di¤erent dimensions of the GP's treatment decisions. Subsequently, we report the e¤ects of di¤erent remuneration schemes on our three di¤erent measures of health outcomes, as described in Section 5.3, and discuss potential implications for welfare and public policy.
Remuneration schemes and treatment decisions
The e¤ects of the type of remuneration scheme on GP behaviour are presented in Table 2 . In the …rst column we report the e¤ect on the total fee per consultation, which is a monetary measure of the total amount of services o¤ered by the GP during a consultation (i.e., the variable q in our theory model). The estimated coe¢ cient indicates that a change in remuneration scheme from …xed salary to fee-for-service leads to a signi…cant increase in the total amount of services provided per consultation. This result is in line with our theoretical prediction. The e¤ect is also economically signi…cant, with a magnitude (of NOK 12.5 or about USD 1.5) that corresponds to a percentage increase of around 4.5.
[ Table 2 ]
In the second and third columns we report estimates along two other dimensions of GP behaviour, namely the frequency of patient recalls (within 14 days) and hospital referrals. The point estimates suggest that, on average, a change in remuneration scheme from …xed salary to fee-for-service leads to a higher frequency of patient recalls and a lower frequency of hospital referrals. These e¤ects are once more in line with our theoretical predictions. The magnitudes of the e¤ects are also far from negligible, with the point estimates suggesting that remuneration type a¤ects average recall and referral rates by 7.7 and 3.6 percent, respectively. However, whereas the former e¤ect is estimated with a relatively high degree of precision, the latter e¤ect is statistically insigni…cant (p-value of 0.135).
The positive e¤ect of fee-for-service on the frequency of patient recalls can partly (though far from fully) explain the result reported in the …nal column of Table 2 , that a change from …xed-salary to fee-for-service remuneration leads to a signi…cant and large increase (by more than 21 percent) in the supply of consultations per day. Thus, fee-for-service remuneration does not only lead to higher service provision per consultation, but it also leads to a higher supply of consultations, which again con…rms our theoretical predictions.
The estimated coe¢ cients on the remaining independent variables suggest that larger amounts of service provision (per consultation) are provided to older, less educated and female patients.
As we would expect, the average age of the patient list population is also positively correlated with the number of consultations supplied per day. On the other hand, the strong negative correlation between the share of low-educated list patients and the supply of consultations suggest that patients with less education have fewer GP visits but receive more services per visit.
The signi…cantly positive e¤ect of fee-for-service payment on the total fee per consultation, as reported in Table 2 , suggests that fee-for-service GPs on average o¤er more services to patients during a consultation. We explore the sources of this e¤ect by estimating the e¤ect of fee-forservice payment on four variables that measure di¤erent types of services o¤ered by the GP: (i) the share of consultations that are prolonged beyond 20 minutes, (ii) the share of consultations in which at least one lab test is taken, (iii) the number of medical procedures per consultation, and (iv) the share of consultations in which a sickness certi…cate is issued.
[ Table 3 ]
The estimated results -reported in Table 3 -show that fee-for-service payment has a statistically signi…cant and positive e¤ect on all four variables. Notice also that the magnitudes of these e¤ects are all quite sizeable. All else equal, if the payment scheme of a GP changes from …xed salary to fee-for-service, the GP will, on average, increase the share of prolonged consultations by 8.5 percent, increase the frequency of testing by 3.7 percent, 21 increase the number of medical procedures by 23.5 percent, and increase the propensity to issue sickness certi…cates by 5.6 percent.
Summing up, we …nd that a change in payment scheme from …xed salary to fee-for-service leads to a (statistically and economically) signi…cant increase in the GP's service provision during a consultation, and this increase applies to all dimensions measured, as evidenced by the results shown in Table 3 . Furthermore, such a change in payment scheme also leads to a higher frequency of patient recalls and a higher supply of consultations. All the above mentioned e¤ects are estimated with a high degree of precision (at least at the 1 percent level of statistical signi…cance), and these results are all consistent with the predictions from our theory model, as summarised by Proposition 1 in Section 3.
Remuneration schemes and health outcomes
The increase in GP service provision due to fee-for-service payment implies, all else equal, a higher cost of primary care provision for the public payer. In fact, the coe¢ cient reported in the …rst column of Table 2 gives a precise estimate of the extra cost per consultation that can be attributed to the change in GP behaviour caused by a change in payment scheme.
However, from a welfare or policy perspective, the additional costs of a fee-for-service payment scheme must be weighed against the potential bene…ts of a higher level of primary care
provision. Does the increase in GP service provision improve patients'health outcomes, or does a fee-for-service system contribute to 'overprovision' of primary care services with little or no health bene…ts? In order to take some steps towards answering this question, we estimate the e¤ects of fee-for-service payment on the three di¤erent measures of health outcomes described in Section 5.3.
[ Table 4 ]
The results, reported in Table 4 , show that patients who have attended a fee-for-service (instead of …xed salary) GP obtain a signi…cantly better health outcome according to all three measures used. The e¤ects are also large in magnitude. Compared to visits with a …xed-salary GP, patients who have visited a fee-for-service GP have, on average, a 15.7 percent lower probability of experiencing an emergency hospital admission within two weeks of the GP consultation. If we restrict these cases to ambulatory care sensitive conditions, the corresponding reduction in emergency admission probability is more than 46 percent. The probability of a visit to a primary care emergency centre within the same time frame is also signi…cantly reduced, by 10.2 percent on average. This result might partly be explained by easier access to own regular GP for patients listed with fee-for-service GPs, for example through longer opening hours, as indicated by the higher number of consultations per day (cf. Table 2 ).
Welfare and policy implications
Our results suggest that the number of emergency admissions to hospital can be reduced by changing GP remuneration from …xed salary to fee-for-service. But at which costs? The value of our estimated coe¢ cient (Table 4) implies that one emergency hospital admission is averted for every 263 GP consultations, on average, if the GP is paid by fee-for-service instead of …xed salary. Since the estimated value of the additional services provided per consultation by a feefor-service GP is NOK 12.55 (Table 2) , this implies that, by a change of remuneration scheme from …xed salary to fee-for-service, emergency admissions to hospital can be reduced at a cost of around NOK 3,300 per averted emergency admission. By comparison, the average cost of emergency hospital admissions during 2009-2013 can be estimated at around NOK 23,000. 22 Even if we only consider the extra payment from the public payer triggered by each emergency hospital admission, which was around NOK 9,200, on average, during 2009-2013, these costs are substantially higher than our estimated costs of reducing emergency hospital admissions through a change in GP remuneration from …xed salary to fee-for-service. 23 Our dependent variables in this part of the analysis are of course imperfect measures of health outcomes, and the results should therefore be interpreted with some care. Nevertheless, our results give some indications that the higher supply of primary care services induced by fee-for-service contracts leads to improved health outcomes, and that emergency admissions to hospital can be reduced at a relatively low cost through changes in GP remuneration, which suggests that GP remuneration based on …xed salaries leads to underprovision of primary care services relative to fee-for-service remuneration.
However, we must stress that there are several caveats to this tentative welfare analysis.
First, by measuring health gains in terms of secondary care cost savings we are hardly capturing the full value of these gains. Second, potential health gains from changes in GP remuneration might also be in ‡uenced by general equilibrium e¤ects in the primary care market. For example, a large-scale change of GP remuneration schemes might lead to exit and entry of physicians, which, in case of GP heterogeneity, might change the distribution of GP 'types'in the market, with corresponding changes in service provision. 24 Furthermore, from a policy perspective, costs and bene…ts in the health care sector should not be evaluated in isolation, but should be seen in conjunction with costs and bene…ts in other sectors that are indirectly a¤ected by changes in GP behaviour. For example, we have shown that fee-for-service payments lead to a higher frequency of sick-listing, which implies that this payment scheme imposes a higher cost on the sickness bene…t system and leads to a productivity loss in the labour market. A full- ‡edged welfare analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper, would need to take all these direct and indirect e¤ects into account.
Potential biases
While our empirical strategy is designed to overcome potential problems related to GPs'selection of remuneration scheme, there might still be remaining sources of bias. In this section we perform additional tests to address two such potential sources: (i) patient selection related to GP remuneration, and (ii) locums'adoption of regular GPs'practice styles. 2 4 We explore the issue of GP heterogeneity in Section 9. 22 
Patient selection
Our identi…cation strategy relies on the implicit assumption that the characteristics of the patient population of a GP is unrelated to the GP's remuneration scheme. However, even if we control for a wide range of patient characteristics, both at aggregate and individual level, such as age, gender, income, education, diagnosis and comorbidity, we cannot a priori rule out the possibility that there might exist some systematic di¤erences between the patients of …xed-salary GPs and fee-for-service GPs that we are not fully able to control for in our empirical model, potentially leading to biased estimates.
We test the hypothesis of patient selection in two di¤erent ways. First we construct a sample consisting of consultations at primary care emergency centres, involving the same patients that we observe in our main sample (consisting of consultations with GP locums). More speci…cally, we construct this sample such that all consultations (at emergency centres) involve patients who, in our main sample, are observed in consultations only with fee-for-service GPs or only with …xed-salary GPs. Naturally, this sample includes all GPs who have treated patients at emergency care centres, therefore a much larger GP population than in the main analysis. As explained in Section 4, attending a primary care emergency centre is an alternative way for patients to access primary care in Norway and is typically used if the patient's regular GP (or a substitute GP) is not available. At PCECs, physicians are paid according to the same fee-forservice schedule as regular GPs and, more importantly, the matching between physicians and patients is random.
This allows us to construct the following placebo test. By de…ning an indicator variable that takes the value 1 (0) if the consultation involves a patient who is observed only in consultations with fee-for-service (…xed-salary) GPs in the main sample, we can test whether these two categories of patients are treated di¤erently, on average, in consultations at primary care emergency centres. Since the matching between patients and GPs at PCECs is random, any such di¤er-ences should only re ‡ect di¤erences in unobserved demand side characteristics between the two patient groups, for instance patient severity. Thus, if the results reported in the previous section are purely caused by di¤erences in GP remuneration schemes, we should not expect to …nd any systematic di¤erences in how the two groups of patients are treated at primary care emergency 23 centres.
We estimate a model equivalent to (5) , where the variable F F S is re-interpreted as indicating whether or not a patient's regular GP is paid by fee-for-service. The model is estimated with the full set of patient characteristics and the same …xed e¤ects as before. Inclusion of GP …xed e¤ects implies that the estimated e¤ects are identi…ed by GPs who at primary care emergency centres treat both patient categories. 25 [ Table 5 ]
The results, reported in Table 5 , reveal that there are practically no di¤erences in the way these two categories of patients are treated in emergency centre consultations. All the point estimates are very close to zero, and the only statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient has the opposite sign of what we would expect if our main results were caused by patient selection on severity.
One potential concern with the above described placebo test is that patients who are observed in consultations at PCECs might not be representative of the entire patient population of regular GPs, such that remaining unobserved di¤erences between the patients of fee-for-service and …xed-salary GPs, respectively, cannot be ruled out. We therefore complement our analysis with a second placebo test, much in the same spirit as the …rst one, where we test for treatment di¤erences across the two categories of patients in regular GP practice consultations, but where the GP is someone else then the patient's regular GP.
When a regular GP is absent from work, the GP is usually replaced by a locum if the period of absence is su¢ ciently long. But for very short-term absences, patients will often be directed to other regular GPs with available capacity within the same municipality. 26 Our data allows us to observe if a consultation takes place with the patient's own regular GP or with another (substitute) regular GP. We use this information to construct a sample of consultations with 'substitute' regular GPs where, in each consultation, the GP is seeing a patient from another GP's list. We construct this sample by imposing the following conditions: (i) the patients do not belong to a list that is shared by two or more GPs, (ii) all patients are observed also in our main sample (involving 471 locums), (iii) each patient is observed only on the list of a fee-for-service GP or only on the list of a …xed-salary GP, (iv) all substitute GPs are paid by fee-for-service, and (v) each substitute GP is observed treating both categories of patients (listed with a fee-for-service GP or a …xed-salary GP).
By applying these sample selection criteria, we are left with a sample of 421,244 observations (consultations), involving 3,371 'substitute'GPs. Using this sample, we estimate a model similar to the placebo test based on PCEC consultations, using the same treatment variables, and where the variable F F S indicates whether or not a patient's regular GP is paid by fee-for-service. This allows us to test whether there are any systematic di¤erences between patients listed with feefor-service vs. …xed salary GPs, based on how they are treated in regular GP consultations by the same substitute GP.
[ Table 6 ]
The results of this alternative placebo test are displayed in Table 6 and clearly show that there are no systematic di¤erences in the treatment o¤ered to these two categories of patients, when they are seen by another regular GP than their own. The point estimates are very close to zero and statistically insigni…cant. The only dimension in which the magnitude of the point estimate is comparable to the e¤ect of fee-for-service remuneration in our main analysis, is the rate of hospital referral. In terms of statistical signi…cance, though, the di¤erence in referral rates between the two patient categories is not distinguishable from zero.
In sum, we take the results from these two tests as reassuring con…rmation that the estimates from our main model do not seem to re ‡ect systematic di¤erences between the patient populations of fee-for-service and …xed-salary GPs.
Practice style adoption
Another potential source of bias is related to the possibility that locums might, to some extent, adopt the practice style of the regular GP that they replace. If the practice style of a GP is in ‡uenced by the culture and environment in which she works, a locum who replaces a GP in a group practice might be similarly in ‡uenced by the other GPs in the practice. 27 And even in solo practices, a locum's treatment behaviour might in theory be in ‡uenced by initial instructions or guidelines given by the regular GP who is being temporarily replaced. If locums'behaviour partly re ‡ects the behaviour of the GPs they replace, the GP selection problem partially reappears.
In order to test the hypothesis of practice style adoption, we once more make use of information about GP behaviour at primary care emergency centres. As explained in Section 4, all regular GPs below the age of 60 are in principle obliged to work at PCECs part of their time. Since a GP's work at her own practice and in a PCEC occur simultaneously over time, it seems reasonable to assume that GPs will, to a large extent, bring their practice styles to the PCECs when working there. Under this assumption, we can use treatment patterns in PCEC consultations to identify di¤erences in practice styles across GPs. In contrast to consultations at regular GP practices, where di¤erences in treatment behaviour across di¤erent GPs might re ‡ect systematic di¤erences in patient characteristics, the random matching of GPs and patients at PCECs implies that, for a su¢ ciently high number of consultations and adequate control for potential confounders, any di¤erences in treatment patterns across GPs must necessarily re ‡ect di¤erences in practice style.
As a proxy for GP practice style, we construct a 'generosity'index, which is a measure based on the GP's average value of service provision (measured by the total fee) per consultation at
PCECs. More speci…cally, we estimate the following regression:
where y ijtm is the total value of primary care service (total fee) provided by GP i to a patient with diagnosis j at time t in a PCEC in municipality m; j , m , and ! t are …xed e¤ects for diagnosis, municipality and time (year, month, and day of the week); and ijtm is a variable indicating whether or not the patient is seen by a GP who is a specialist in general medicine. 28 The sample of consultations is restricted to those involving GPs that are observed in at least 250 PCEC consultations. The index is calculated by taking the mean of the unexplained random variation " ijtm for each GP from this regression and add the average value of service provision for all GPs (which is equal to NOK 367.85). The distribution of GP practice styles, based on the above described 'generosity index', is displayed in Figure 1 , which shows that the index is close to normally distributed with a fair amount of variation across GPs.
[ Figure 1 here ] Our next step is to use the set of locum consultations where the locum replaces a fee-forservice GP. We restrict the consultation sample to one remuneration type to control for the locum's own incentives. From this set of consultations, we identify the set of locums that, during the period of observation, replace at least two GPs that are included in the 'generosity index' sample. We then re-estimate (5) using the same set of dependent variables as shown in Tables 2-3 , but replacing the variable F F S with our measure of GP practice style, which enables us to test whether the same locum behaves di¤erently depending on the practice style of the GP that she replaces, all else equal. If locums'treatment behaviour is characterised by practice style adoption, it should be re ‡ected by positive and statistically signi…cant estimate of this coe¢ cient.
[ Tables 7 and 8 ] The results of these regressions, given in Tables 7-8 Thus, although this is certainly a less than perfect test for practice style adoption, the results from this test nevertheless give support to our interpretation of the main results in Tables 2-3, namely that the estimated di¤erences in treatment behaviour are causally explained by changes in remuneration scheme.
Pro…t orientation and GP selection
In this section we extend our empirical analysis by exploring potential di¤erences between GP types, and the importance of GP selection into di¤erent types of remuneration schemes, by linking GPs'behaviour as locums to their remuneration scheme when they later on enter the market as 27 regular GPs. GPs are likely to di¤er along several dimensions that are not directly observable, including their degree of altruism or pro…t-orientation, as measured by the parameter in our theory model. In Section 3 we show that the e¤ects of di¤erent remuneration schemes on GP behaviour are smaller the less pro…t-oriented the GPs are. In our main analysis, we control for GP heterogeneity by estimating models with GP-…xed e¤ects, and our estimated e¤ects of di¤erent remuneration schemes capture the average response of a group of GPs that presumably di¤er in their degree of pro…t orientation.
In order to explore the possibility of heterogeneous e¤ects along this particular dimension, we exploit the fact that our data allows us to observe some of the GP locums (in the main sample) after they have entered the market as regular GPs, either with a fee-for-service contract or with a …xed-salary contract. While we have argued that the matching between GP and type of remuneration scheme in short-term vacancies is to a large extent random, it seems entirely reasonable to assume that the type of remuneration scheme a GP is exposed to in a regular practice is, to a much larger extent, a result of the GP's own choice. Being a self-employed GP with fee-for-service payment is potentially much more pro…table, but also entails much more risk, than being employed on a …xed-salary contract. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that more pro…t-oriented GPs seek to enter the market in fee-for-service practices, whereas less pro…t-oriented GPs tend to select themselves into …xed-salary practices. If this assumption holds, we can explore how the e¤ects of di¤erent remuneration schemes depend on the GP's degree of pro…t-orientation by constructing a sample of consultations involving GP locums who later become regular GPs (within our period of observation). We then re-estimate (5), adding to the regression equation a term interacting the variable F F S with another indicator variable that takes the value 1 (0) if the locum later becomes a regular GP with a …xed salary (fee-for-service)
contract. This allows us to test whether the treatment response to changes in remuneration scheme systematically di¤ers between these two physician categories. 29 [ Tables 9 and 10 ] The results are presented in Tables 9 and 10 (which correspond to Tables 2 and 3 in Section 7) . Although the estimated e¤ects are not perfectly consistent across all dimensions of GP behaviour, these results nevertheless indicate that more pro…t-oriented physicians (proxied by their choice of remuneration contract as regular GPs) tend to respond signi…cantly stronger to changes in remuneration scheme when working as locums. These di¤erences occur along several dimensions and are particularly pronounced for the total value of service provision (total fee) per consultation, the daily supply of consultations, and the number of medical procedures performed during a consultation.
In sum, these results are consistent with our theoretical predictions that the e¤ects of di¤erent remuneration schemes are stronger for more pro…t-oriented GPs, and therefore add credibility to our underlying assumption that more pro…t-oriented GPs are more likely to select themselves into GP practices with fee-for-service payments. As such, these results also underline the importance of our identi…cation strategy in order to overcome this selection problem.
Locums versus regular GPs
In this penultimate section of the paper, we brie ‡y explore the potential importance and implications of our main empirical strategy by comparing our results on primary care provision in Tables 3 and 4 with the corresponding results obtained using a sample of regular GPs instead of locums. Because of the low number of regular GPs who switch between di¤erent contract types, the e¤ects of remuneration scheme on the behaviour of regular GPs cannot be estimated with physician …xed e¤ects, therefore exposing the analysis to the potential problem of GP selection. In the Appendix, we show that, a priori, the direction in which our results would be biased by GP selection is not clear. Given that GP selection is driven by the degree of pro…t-orientation, and that pro…t-oriented GPs provide more (less) services then altruistic GPs under fee-for-service (…xed salary), the e¤ect of remuneration type on GP service provision is likely to be overestimated (underestimated) if the share of pro…t-oriented physicians is su¢ ciently low (high), or if the di¤erence in service provision under fee-for-service is su¢ ciently large (small) relative to the di¤erence in service provision under …xed salary, all else equal.
However, besides a potential selection bias, there is also another relevant di¤erence between locums and regular GPs, namely the time horizon of the decision making. Since the GP locums mainly …ll relatively short-term vacancies (cf. Figures A1-A3 in the Appendix), their decision making is presumably taking place in the context of …xed demand. Thus, our choice of empirical strategy implies that we are measuring mainly short-run e¤ects of remuneration type on physician behaviour. Regular GPs, on the other hand, have presumably a longer time horizon, taking into account that their behaviour is likely to a¤ect demand. More speci…cally, it seems reasonable to assume that demand depends positively on the amount of services provided by the GP. If so, this implies that the di¤erence in GPs'incentives for service provision under fee-forservice and …xed salary, respectively, is larger in the long run (for regular GPs) than in the short run (for locums). In other words, a regular GP that is paid by fee-for-service might provide a higher amount of services not only to generate more revenues from a …xed list of patients, but also to attract more patients to his list. 30 In sum, the di¤erences between regular GPs and locums related to selection and time horizon indicate that smaller estimated e¤ects of remuneration scheme when using a sample of regular GPs can only be explained by selection bias, whereas larger e¤ects can be explained by both selection bias and di¤erences in time horizon. To explore this further, we contrast our main results in Tables 3 and 4 with the corresponding results derived from a re-estimation of (5) based on consultations involving all regular GPs on …xed salary and a random sample of 10 percent of regular GPs with fee-for-service contracts. The estimation regression is identical to (5) apart from the absence of GP …xed e¤ects.
[ Tables 11 and 12 ] The results, which are displayed in Tables 11 and 12 , show a qualitatively similar picture as the results based on consultations with locums. However, with few exceptions, the magnitude of the e¤ects is larger for the sample with regular GP consultations. Although the e¤ects shown in Tables 11-12 could be overestimated due to GP selection bias, our conjecture is that the di¤erence between the two sets of results can, at least partly, be explained by the longer time horizon of regular GPs, where considerations for future demand are incorporated in the GP's treatment decisions. For example, the 11 percent increase in the rate of sickness certi…cation (as a result of fee-for-service remuneration) compared to the 5.6 percent increase for locums, could be explained by an e¤ect documented in a recent paper by Markussen and Røed (2017), who
show that patients tend to choose GPs with a more lenient sick-listing practice.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyse the e¤ects of two di¤erent types of physician remuneration -fee-forservice and …xed salary -on physicians' treatment decisions and patients' health outcomes.
Using extremely rich Norwegian register data, covering the period 2009-2013, we estimate the e¤ects of remuneration type on a wide range of outcome variables, including objective measures of health outcomes. We identify these e¤ects empirically by comparing the treatment behaviour of the same physicians (GP locums) working under di¤erent payment schemes in di¤erent shortterm vacancies within a relatively short period of time, which is our strategy to overcome the problem of self-selection of physicians into di¤erent remuneration schemes.
We …nd strong and consistent results. All else equal, if a GP is paid by fee-for-service instead of a …xed salary, the GP supplies a higher number of consultations, o¤ers more prolonged consultations, performs more medical procedures and takes more tests per consultation, recalls patients more often and issues more often sickness certi…cates. All these results con…rm a set of hypotheses that we derive from a simple theoretical model of physician behaviour under …xed demand. This model also predicts that the aforementioned e¤ects are stronger for more pro…t-oriented physicians, which we con…rm in our empirical analysis by using type of contract (fee-for-service or …xed salary) as regular GP as a proxy for the locum GP's degree of pro…t-orientation.
The type of GP remuneration is also found to have signi…cant and strong e¤ects on patients'
health outcomes, as measured by the probability of emergency admissions to hospital shortly after a GP consultation. All else equal, this probability is almost 16 percent lower if the GP is paid by fee-for-service instead of …xed salary. If we restrict this measure to emergency admissions for ambulatory care sensitive conditions, the resulting drop in probability is more than 46
percent. When seen in conjunction, our estimates suggest that, by making GP payment based on fee-for-service instead of …xed salary, emergency admissions to hospitals can be reduced at a cost of around NOK 3,300 per averted emergency admission. This indicates that …xed-salary payment of physicians leads to underprovision of primary care services.
Finally, we would like to stress that, by basing our analysis on the behaviour of locums who mainly …ll relatively short-term vacancies, we are essentially measuring the short-run e¤ects of remuneration type on physician behaviour. Given that GP-speci…c demand responds positively to the GP's level of service provision in the longer run, our estimates of the e¤ects of remuneration type on GPs'service provision could arguably be seen as lower bound estimates of the long run e¤ects.
(iii) Consultations. From (4), we de…ne the GP's marginal bene…t of consultations as
The di¤erence in the marginal bene…ts of consultations between fee-for-service GPs and …xed-salary GPs can be written as Service provision. From (2), the di¤erence in the marginal bene…t of service provision between fee-for-service GPs and …xed-salary GPs is constant and given by p. It also follows from (2) that q ( ; s) is monotonically increasing in . Because of the convexity of the e¤ort cost function, c (q), the increase in the marginal bene…t of service provision (by switching from …xed salary to fee-for-service) will have a smaller (positive) e¤ect on optimal service provision when is higher. Thus, the di¤erence q (1; s) q (0; s) is strictly decreasing in .
Patient referral. It follows directly from the above proof of s (1) s (0) that a higher value of increases the scope for a corner solution in the optimal referral decision of a fee-for-service GP (i.e., s (1) = s (0) = b s). Furthermore, in case of an interior solution under fee-for-service contracts (i.e., s (1) > s (0) = b s), since q (1; s) is monotonically increasing in , a higher value of will reduce the surplus from service provision (pq (1; s ) c (q (1; s ))), thereby reducing the marginal bene…t of a higher referral threshold s . Simultaneously, a higher value of increases the marginal cost of a higher referral threshold, since the patient bene…t of specialist care is given a larger weight (cf. Eq. (3)). In sum, this implies that an increase in leads to a reduction in s (1), thereby reducing the di¤erence in referral practice between fee-for-service and …xed-salary GPs.
Consultations. If follows directly from (4) that a higher value of increases the marginal bene…t of consultations, thereby increasing the optimal number of consultations o¤ered. For a given di¤erence in the marginal gain of consultations, m (1) m (0) as de…ned by (A2), the convexity of k (n) then reduces the positive e¤ect of switching to fee-for-service payment when is higher. This is equivalent to the e¤ect on service provision as explained above.
Additionally, a higher value of also reduces the di¤erence m (1) m (0), thereby reinforcing the previously explained e¤ect. A higher value of reduces the di¤erence between m (1) and m (0) through two di¤erent channels. First, a higher increases the optimal service provision.
Because of the convexity of c (q), this reduces the additional surplus that can be gained by service provision under fee-for-service remuneration, which contributes to reducing the di¤erence between m (1) and m (0). Second, a higher reduces s (1), as previously shown, which in turn reduces the expected marginal bene…t of consultations under fee-for-service due to the possibility of treating instead of referring (last term in (A2)).
Distribution of temporary vacancies according to their duration
In Figures A1-A3 we show the distribution of temporary GP positions according to their duration (in weeks). 
GP selection bias
In order to derive some conditions determining the direction of the bias caused by GP selection, consider a stylised example with two types of physicians, pro…t-oriented and altruistic, denoted by P and A, respectively, and suppose that pro…t-oriented physician constitute a share of the total physician mass. Let q i S and q i F F S be the amount of services o¤ered by a type i physician under …xed salary and fee-for-service, respectively, where i = P; A. Suppose further that the population of regular GPs is characterised by complete self-selection of physicians to remuneration schemes, where pro…t-oriented physicians select fee-for-service contracts whereas altruistic physicians select …xed-salary contracts. 31 Now assume that the ranking of service provision across physician types and remuneration schemes is given by
In other words, fee-for-service induces more service provision than …xed salary for both physician types, but altruistic physicians provide more services than pro…t-oriented physicians if remuneration is …xed salary, whereas the opposite is true if remuneration is fee-for-service.
Under these assumptions, if we compare service provision across the two remuneration schemes for regular GPs, the e¤ect of fee-for-service is given by
On the other hand, the average e¤ect of fee-for-service for locums, under the assumption of random assignment, is given by
Thus, by using regular GPs, the e¤ect of fee-for-service is overestimated (underestimated) if
It can easily be shown that this condition is given by
Thus, the e¤ect is overestimated if the share of pro…t-oriented physicians is su¢ ciently low, or if q P F F S q A F F S is su¢ ciently large relative to q A S q P S . Otherwise, the e¤ect is underestimated. 1 Means per day of practice. 2 Means for the employed part of the patient list population. 3 Emergency admission at primary care emergency centre (PCEC) within 7 days after GP consultation. 4 Emergency admission at somatic hospital within 14 days after GP consultation. 5 Patients aged 20 and above. 1) The patient sample is restricted to patients who are observed merely in consultations with fee-for-service GPs or with fixed-salary GPs.
Tables
2) The variable equals 1 if the patient is enlisted with a regular GP with FFS payment. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors are clustered at physician level.
1) The GP observed is the locum GP, while the variable of interest (the index) is based on the behaviour of regular GPs that the locum GP has substituted for. 
